BOOK REVIEW
Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941
Author: Alberto Sbacchi; 1997 (pb. 473 pp.)
Reviewed by Negussay Ayele
Familiarity with Alberto Sbacchi's earlier work in English, (Ethiopia Under Mussolini, Zed Press) that came out at the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia, tempts oneat first blushto presume that this current publication may be a recycled edition of that 1985 book. Instead, a closer perusal of Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941 shows that it is a carefully pastiched "reproduction" of articles and conference papers done by the author from 1975 to 1986 on the general theme of checkered relations between Ethiopia and Fascist Italy in the period 1935 to1941. The impressive editing and chronological flow of the text makes for virtually seamless and smooth reading in which one hardly notices the fact that this is a volume of 'collected works' featuring materials already published ten to twenty years ago on profiles of the period.
With that prefatory contextual statement we can focus on the main points of the book. The volume begins with a concise summary of the efforts and views of Marcus Garvey, the Jamaican leader of the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), with respect to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, how it should be resisted and the pros and cons of the Emperor's leadership including his decision to take exile in London in effect jumping from one Italian (white) fire to another British (white) skillet. According to Dr Sbacchi, Marcus Garvey expressed in writing his "bitterness and disillusionment with Haile Selassie's attitude" as it is alleged that the Emperor or his entourage shunned black delegations (including Marcus Garvey himself) that came to London to meet with him and offer their moral and material support to defend Ethiopia. A legitimate question to ask with regard to the exiled Emperor's itinerary at this time is who really controlled protocol in London. Most likely the foreign offfice of the host (British) government issued guidelines and made crucial decisions with respect to foreign contacts by the Ethiopian (exile) side especially initially and did not mind if some black feathers were ruffled along the way. And in all probability they also saw to it that the Emperor and his entourage would take the blame for any diplomatic faux pas in the process.
A more serious issue that has been around for some time and repeated in the book is the allegation that Ethiopians did not regard themselves as 'Negro' and thereby denied being black. On this point, however, the latter conclusion does not follow from the former. As aptly explained by Dr. Melaku Bayen, Ethiopia's Special Envoy for the Western Hemisphere in the 1930s, "Ethiopians merely objected to the word 'Negro' and not to being classified with their blood brothers in America with whom they shared a common ancestry." (p.23) As should be well known, the appelation, Negro, is a culture-specific one with pejorative overtones assigned by whites to peoples of African descent and not a self-chosen designation. The fact that presently the term 'Negro' has been all but discarded in favour of terms like 'Black' or African-American only proves that it was a pseudo-issue to accuse Ethiopians of denying their black identity because they refused to call themselves 'Negro.' An informative treatment of this maligned topic is found in Prof. William R. Scott's recent publication, The Sons of Sheba's Race (Bloomington, 1993, pp193-207) In it he cites J.A. Rogers' cogent statement that "White visitors did all they could to popularize the Ethiopians' Caucasoid roots (after the Adwa Battle). Yet, 'while telling the Amharas (i.e., Ethiopians) they were a superior race before their faces, the Europeans called them 'niggers' behind their backs."
The next section of the book comprising chapters two to seven deals with the launching of Mussolini's Fascist invasion and the Ethiopian patriotic resistance. Curiously, although the author deals with resistance throughout the text, he titles one of his chapters as "Opposition to Italian Rule." Dr Sbacchi's treatment is profusely documented mostly by Fascist and other Italian sources. His presentation of the use of poison gas on defenceless Ethiopians is crisp and informative. To Ethiopian victims, of course, what transpired in the 1930s was not new but a modernized/industrial form of savagery and bestiality displayed by Italian colonialists in earlier offensives in Adwa which has been discussed recently by this reviewer in the pages of Ethiopian Review under the title of "Adwa 1896: Who Was Savage and Who Was Civilized?" As the author points out, however, "Chemical warfare...did not solve the military problems as demonstrated by the stiff resistance of the Ethiopian troops" (p. 63).
It is difficult to decide where to begin to describe what Fascist bestiality and brutality in Ethiopia was really like. By way of offering a few vignettes of Fascism in practice, one can recall viceroy Grazianithe butcher of Addis Ababawho declared that his boss, the Duce, "can have Ethiopia with or without Ethiopiansas he wishes." (Cited in A. Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, Chicago, 1969, p.113) Or, what about Mussolini's son, Vittorio, who took Fascist honours to be among the first to fly into Ethiopia and drop bombs. At first, he was disappointed that unlike in Hollywood movies thatched roofs of peasants in Ethiopia did not explode into a big shroud of dust. However, later he described his morbid elation when he bombed people running helter skelter in open fields and "the group opened up just like a flowering rose. It was most entertaining." (J. Dugan and Laurence Lafore, Days of Emperor and Clown... New York, 1973, p. 256) And in addition to the barbaric and random use of poison gas, there were constant telegraphic orders by commandante Mussolini "to kill off young Ethiopian intellectuals," "all suspects must be executed," "all adult males must be shot"... (Cited in the author's earlier work Ethiopia under Mussolini , p. 237).
The last part of the book deals with Italy's international politics and Ethiopia's position as a "pawn"to borrow from the title of Ernest Work's excellent publication, Ethiopia: A Pawn in European Diplomacy. The international side of this period (1935-1941) of Ethiopian history has a kind of Jekyll and Hyde character. On the one hand we have a litany of betrayal, duplicity and calousness vis-a-vis the plight of Ethiopia especially during the early stages on the part of Europeans and the United States. This was starkly evident in the way the League of Nations gave the choice 'between assassination and suicide' to Ethiopia as one of the Emperor's advisors in Geneva put it. In the event Mussolini went ahead with his declared plan to assassinate Ethiopia and the League committed suicide. The other international side was of a more positive nature for Ethiopians and consternating for the Fascists. Millions of Africans, peoples of African descent elsewhere as well as quite a few other folks with a sense of justice and humanity everywhere rallied to the defence of Ethiopia and its right to independence as a number of recent publications have highlighted. Mussolini's Fascist invasion of Ethiopia not only presaged but also became part and parcel of World War II and then the Allies' struggle against the Axis powers began to snowball in the Horn of Africa.
The volume is impressive in presenting and documenting Italian perspectives, policies and politics regarding the 1935 invasion and subsequent protracted struggles at occupation (1936-41) of parts of Ethiopia. The author does a rather credible and informative treatment of the subject matter here. Although everyone may not be comfortable with the veracity, integrity or intrinsic value of Fascist sources and 'documents' for much of the book, one can appreciate the valuable service in giving the devil (in this case Mussolini and his cohorts) his due. In light of ominous trends in much of Europe, including Italy of right-wing and fascistic movements being on the rise, this is a good a time to unearth and portray these sources for what they are. In the Introduction to the book the author (along with A. Del Boca) caution that "...the theme of the Fascist regime as a justification for colonialism remains alive in Italian culture."
There are, however, several curious statements and notions not backed by adequate (or any) substantiation that are puzzling and unsettling especially to an Ethiopian reader. In one paragraph (p.28) the reader is told that "Ethiopia remained isolated from African affairs...," that "in the mid-1940s a small group of Black Americans were invited to Ethiopia..." The next paragraph then begins with the sentence: "Gradually Ethiopia changed its policy of isolation by participating in African conferences." There are at least two problems here. To begin with, it must be clarified that it was not Ethiopia's policy to isolate itself from African affairs. Rather, it was the cordon sanitaire imposed upon it by colonialism as was the case with other African countries that 'forced' Ethiopia to be isolated from normal contact with colonial regions within the continent. The ambiguity of this premise then leads to the sequel statement next that Ethiopia 'changed its policy of isolation.' Ethiopia did not wish to be isolated from African affairs in the first place and what changed in the late 1950s and the 1960s was that the colonial walls started crumbling and Africans could communicate with one another directly and freely.
On this same page one finds also another astounding claim: "In the Second World War, Ethiopia had been liberated thanks to the sacrifice of African troops..." On page 330 it is also asserted that "the British liberated Ethiopia." To be sure, it is not the first time that one has read such lines. However, when one takes a second look at the Italian invasion, and Ethiopian resistance as a whole and not just at its tail end, one would emerge with a more ballanced picture without taking anything away from the belated but important British and African involvement and sacrifices (including also South African and Indian troops). The fact of the matter is that Ethiopian patriots had been fighting relentlessly for five years (1936-1941) losing untold numbers of lives and limbs to Fascist guns, bombs and poison gas perpetually making the Italians feel like they were walking on hot charcoal and sleeping on broken glass. By the time British led forces came into the fray in January 1941after Mussolini declared war on Britain in June,1940 and then invaded forthwith British colonies of Sudan, Kenya and Somalilandthe Fascists had for all intents and purposes lost their war of invasion in Ethiopia. As the author himself notes in the book, Mussolini's Roman Council of Empire had already been abolished in 1940. Ethiopians are not an ungrateful people and in various ways they have shown their gratitude for the help that was rendered in the twilight of their protracted war of resistance. But to say that Ethiopia was liberated thanks to British and colonial troops without any qualification would be neither factual nor fair. How about something like "Thanks also to British and African military intervention in the final mopping up stages of the resistance struggle?"
On page 164 we find a categorical claim that "Ironically, the Ethiopians had at first acclaimed the arrival of Italians in 1936, thinking the Italians would improve their living conditions and develop the country" without any substantiation. If the statement read "some" Ethiopians or "in certain quarters" it might have been passable. But, as it is, this sweeping assertion cannot stand the acid test of scholarly scrutiny. In fact, in an earlier passage (p.125) the author had stated that "The majority of Ethiopians resisted Italian intrusion and colonial order in direct relationship to their increased sense of nationalism." Especially when one puts this claim or proposition in historical perspective of repeated Ethiopian resistance to Italian attempts at subduing and colonizing Ethiopia in whole or in part in Sahati and Dogali (1887), Amba Alage (1895), Mekele and Adwa (1896), Wel Wel (1934), Adwa (1935), MaiChew and Addis Ababa (1936)... it would be far-fetched to find a basis for Ethiopians to "acclaim" the arrival of Fascist hordes into their country. One other point in this vein is the ambiguous statement on page 318 that "with the restoration of Haile Selassie to the throne in 1941, the Ethiopians saw the return to absolutism, injustice, civil and ethnic uprisings..." This statement is both curious and dubious in that it is not clear if the author is saying that it was a mistake to have the Emperor restored to the throne which is a metaphor for saying that Ethiopia regained its full sovereignty because of the events that followed his restoration. Or is it to say that it was right for Mussolini (or any other colonial upstart) to have dethroned the Emperor. After wading through some three hundred pages of pedestrian documentation on the atrocities of Fascism in Ethiopia it is hard to fathom the need or wisdom for this loaded statement. On a lighter side, it would have enhanced the readability of the book if a more careful clerical editing of Ethiopian names would have been done or a new guide to writing Ethiopian proper names would have been offered to obviate the likes of Nekept, Asghedon, Dannow, Ajalu, Dindle, Nugguru etc.
In fairness, it must be said that publications by Ethiopian writers on the Fascist invasion for the author to have perused are virtually non-existant in foreign languages and only few and far between in Ethiopic as well. So this may have been a handicap. More recently, however, a few works in Ethiopic (Amharic) have emerged and perhaps consulting them might be useful for another edition of the book. These include m] Ñ[O« ({Àc ±¨JÄ) &|¿å¼" ezÃÀ` úHz*ª* CÀ| (¿Ke Ohi) ¹&|¿å¼ ¹×H&¼ Ù`| (ä«H:e ) ¹{]¡ Re{¨i (žvÀ Q+J) Øm%` vd ({Àc SÞ) w y^ ({y` ªQ)
One point this reviewer takes issue with is the choice of the lead title Legacy of Bitterness. Given the fact that we are dealing here with a serious historical episode, it is important that the title chosen reflects the content and that the content bears out what was pregnant in the title. Already Ethiopians have been subjected to dubious and misleading titles on the (1935-1941) Fascist invasion including, for example, "Haile Sellassie's War" (instead of Mussolini's War) "The Ethiopian War" (instead of The Italian War) "The Italo-Ethiopian War" (instead of The Fascist War of Aggression in Ethiopia). Such titles are misleading in that they blur the line between an unjust war of aggression and just war of resistance. They dilute the bestiality of Fascism by virtually equating the villain and the victim and purporting the invasion as though it was like a basketball match between two equally ready and equally willing competitors on a level playing field. Having said that with respect to portrayals of the dramatic events in the Horn of Africa in the period 1935-1941, we come to the text at hand and the validity or rationale of calling it "Legacy of Bitterness."
The primary question that occurs to the mind is "whose legacy of bitterness and bequeathed to whom?" A collateral question is "has the book demontrated what is meant by "bitterness" and how it transpired and has been perpetuated as a legacy for posterity?" Besides the fact that it was just adopted as the book title from one of the constituent articles published originally in 1975, the title has little or no intrinsic and explicit factual or logical relevance to the subject-matter in review. If by implication the reader is to assume that "bitterness" characterizes Ethiopian reaction to the Fascist aggression, it is not borne out by the facts then or now. The very first proclamation Emperor Haile Selassie made to his people early in1941 just as he was crossing the Ethiopia-Sudan border into his land and before he entered his capital (cited in Del Boca's book) was:
Assemble in a convenient place all Italians who surrender to you; armed or unarmed, they are to be treated as prisoners of war. Do not make them suffer for the suffering they inflicted on us. Show them that you are worth to be called soldiers, that you are honorable and merciful men. Do not forget that during the battle of Adwa, our heroic warriors took the Italians they had captured to the Emperor and so enhanced the luster and nobility of our country's name...
Unless the sentiment of "bitterness" has acquired a new meaning, these are certainly not the utterances of bitterness or expressions designed to perpetuate a legacy of bitterness. In fact, one does not know what new developments have occured to warrant the title "Legacy of Bitterness" when the author's other book in English (already cited herein) was published in 1985 and now (1997) when his current one was issued. The tunes were different then wherein (p.224) he had observed that "The good Italo-Ethiopian relations, after the defeat in East Africa, are an irony of history." Nowhere is the total lack of bitterness more evident on the part of ordinary Ethiopians than the civil way they comported themselves after the invasion towards Italians in the country. If one were to use a mundane analogy, "bitterness" is not the first sentiment that would occur to someone who gets bitten by a dog, even a rabid one. Except for occasional repetition of the phrase, there is no expalanation of the need or rationale for using "Legacy of Bitterness." In the circumstances we are left to muse if what is probably meant or implied here may refer to bitter taste in the mouths of Italianor to be more exact, Fascistelements at having lost (Adwa de ja vu) their war of aggression against Ethiopia. If that is so, then are we talking about such legacy of defeat again and again by Italy being perpetuated from generation to generation? This may very well be plausible and certainly worth pondering upon. But one has to grope in the dark even to arrive at such conclusions. On balance then one has to deem this "Legacy of Bitterness" epitaph as unfortunate and misplaced even as a commercial allure. Certainly, the sub-title "Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941 would have been just right, unambiguous and consistent with the bulk of the contents of the book.
One last comment to be made about the book has to do with the "Conclusion" which normally should emanate from and relate to the main themes and historical parameters of the volume. Unless the book 'Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941' was put together in order for the author to share his opinions on current affairs in Ethiopia in the 1960s and thereafter, one does not see how this recent period constitutes part of the 'conclusion' of the historical study. It is telling that there is no parallel treatment of political questions and problems in post-Mussolini Italy in the 'conclusion' of this book on Ethiopia and Fascist Italy... One might suggest respectfully that if the itch is there the author consider working on a self-contained article or even a book on current affairs of Ethiopia and/or Italia that might stand on its own feet and have some edifying merit in its own right.
Donald Levine of Wax and Gold and Greater Ethiopia renown once said that books about Ethiopia were either banned or boring. When all is said and done, Cavaliere Professor Alberto Sbacchi's volume of collected works, (Legacy of Bitterness) Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941, is neither boring nor banned. It is very much worth reading especially for those with limited or no immediate access to Italianalbeit mostly Fascistsources.
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Negussay Ayele, Ph.D., is Professor of Political Science.
