Ladies and gents!
First we will read about this genocidal snake's backstabbing of Al-Bashir (another genocidal monster)

SUBJECT: MELES ON SUDAN: ICC AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY
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¶1. (S/NF) In a January 30 meeting, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told Acting AF Assistant Secretary Phil Carter and AF/SPG Director Tim Shortley that with the expected ICC indictment of Sudanese President Bashir either 1) someone within Khartoum would take advantage of the move to attempt to remove Bashir, or 2) such an attempt will either fail or be aborted. While Meles gave the chances of success for option 1 as nearly zero due to the close knit ties among senior National Congress Party (NCP) officials, he argued that the result would leave the Bashir government a "wounded animal" that is more desperate. Meles argued that to the NCP leadership, their approach is "perfectly rational." He explained that the Government of Sudan (GoS) thought it had moved left bad relations with the U.S. behind when they signed the Naivasha Agreements, only to, in their view, have the USG move the goal posts As a result, Meles suggested that the NCP believes that the "U.S. will get them one way or the other" and if they see their options as either "to die today or die tomorrow, they will chose to employ delaying mechanisms allowing them to die tomorrow." As such, they have no need to resolve problems with the South because it will bring no benefit to them. Facing such calculus, Meles analyzed the GoS approach as to 1) postpone a vote on the South, 2) buy time in Darfur, and 3) "hope for a miracle in 2011." Meles suggested that if he were the U.S., he would either 1) remove the NCP regime or, if that weren't an option, 2) make clear to the GoS that the U.S. is not out to get it and explicitly lay out what is expected of the GoS on Darfur and the South to avoid continued challenges.

End Summary.
DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF ICC INDICTMENT
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¶2. (C) Prime Minister Meles told Acting A/S Carter that the International Criminal Court (ICC)
indictment of Sudanese President Bashir could provide a signal to someone in Khartoum to attempt to remove Bashir through a coup. Although noting that he has been hearing many rumors of such desires from within Khartoum, Meles said that he did not give too much credence to most of these, but highlighted the implications that such rumors have for the climate in Khartoum. Still, Meles argued that such an option, if attempted, would likely have a 100 percent chance of failing due to the close connections and mutual support for one another among senior NCP officials which would suppress any coup attempt. If Bashir remains in power, either because no such coup attempt is made or an attempt fails, the indictment will leave the Bashir regime a wounded animal that is more desperate than ever.

THE PERSPECTIVE FROM KHARTOUM
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¶3. (C) While acknowledging Carter's point that Khartoum's actions seem to undermine their own long-term interests, Meles argued that from their own perspective, the NCP's actions are perfectly rational. While the "Islamic agenda" may have motivated the regime ten years ago, today they are interested only in money and power, Meles posited. While the GoS thought that they had moved away from a climate of bad relations with Washington when they signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Naivasha, they perceive the United States as having shifted the goal posts on them since. As a result, Meles argued that the GoS believes that "the U.S. will get them one way or the other," and from that perspective, they are already in a corner. Believing they will lose, they perceive no benefit to them of resolving the problems of South Sudan. Instead, Meles argued that the NCP's strategy is to postpone a vote on the South, buy time on Darfur, and "hope for a miracle" in 2011. Seeing the U.S. position leaving them with the options of either "to die today or die tomorrow, they will chose to employ delaying mechanisms allowing them to die tomorrow." ¶4. (C) Meles was explicit that the GoS does not trust the United States, but acknowledged that "to some extent they are ADDIS ABAB 00000259 002 OF 002 immune to" a rational discussion with clear benchmarks that allow them an out. Still, Meles claimed that the GoS has suggested that if they get a way out, they may take it. While acknowledging that the GoS "may try to string (the U.S.) along," Meles argued that the real issue is whether there is a possibility of U.S.-NCP negotiations. If that is an option, Meles advised, it could lead to rational discussions. ETHIOPIA'S

ADVICE FOR MOVING FORWARD
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¶5. (S/NF) Meles offered that if he were the United States, he would look at two options. First, which he clearly conveyed as the preferred choice, would be to "remove the Bashir regime." Acknowledging that such an option was unlikely, Meles advocated for making a clear representation to the GoS that the United States is not/not "out to get them" and laying out clear benchmarks of actions expected of the GoS on both Darfur and South Sudan that would be necessary to "avoid continued challenges" with the U.S. Meles concluded the discussion by highlighting that "they don't trust the Obama Administration," and "they trust the Obama Administration less than the Bush Administration," and with a clear reference to U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice and former Senior NSC Director for Africa Gayle Smith "...especially some friends of mine."

YAMAMOTO

Here is the next section that shows this genocidal monsters worshiping Arabs and degrading the South Sudanese.

Meles: U.S. No Longer Part of the Sudan Problem
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¶3. (C) Meles broached the subject of the newly announced U.S. policy on Sudan, saying, "I understand the basic thrust of the new strategy and I am very pleasantly surprised at the speed and scope of the modification." He said that, in the past, the USG "was seen to be cutting off a possible soft landing due to the moralizing of the U.S. and others, and we were heading towards an implosion in Sudan. With this new policy, we have an opening and the U.S. is no longer part of the problem."

¶4. (C) Meles offered Gration advice on how the revised U.S. policy might be leveraged to make Washington a force for peace. Drawing a sharp contrast between the governing capacity of political leaders in the north (National Congress Party) and south (Sudan People's Liberation Movement), he said, "The key to progress is the north. They have leadership and can make decisions. Leaders in the south are incapable of making decisions, so there is no question of making good or bad decisions."

¶5. (C) Meles believes this north/south leadership gap provides a way forward for the U.S. in Sudan. He suggested that the U.S. broker a deal with the north and convince the south to accept it. Playing such a role, he added, would require the U.S. to thoroughly appreciate the limits of its own powers and the different perceptions of the U.S. held by Sudanese leaders in the north and south. He said the U.S. should realize that it "can stop an agreement but cannot impose one."

¶6. (C) Regarding the northern leadership, Meles said, "The only card any country has to play with Sudan is normalization." He added that the U.S. naturally "wants certain things for normalization while some other countries want the U.S. to use this card to protect their interests rather than yours." He said the U.S. should enter any dialogue with NCP leaders fully aware that the north tends to hold seemingly inconsistent views of U.S. On the one hand, they fear and distrust the U.S., seeing it as a deceitful superpower that for a decade victimized Sudan by blowing the Darfur situation out of proportion in order to renege on its commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement while, on the other hand, they underestimate the U.S. and overestimate their strength. He said some northern movements believe Sudan to be a superpower, and dismiss the U.S., because they have faith that God is on their side and that the time has come "for God to pay dividends with interest." He added that "we will talk to them to try to get them to come down to earth."

¶7. (C) Meles' soundings of southern leaders convinces him that they believed the previous U.S. administration would eventually "give them independence on a silver platter" and that they are now fearful that the new administration is more interested in appeasement. He recommended the U.S. have a frank dialogue with southern leaders, explaining what any U.S. administration can and cannot do for them and describing concessions they would have to make along the way, such as accepting a linkage at some stage between referendum and post-referendum issues. Meles said a way has to be found to address SPLM fears that have arisen from their own

ADDIS ABAB 00002732 002 OF 002

ineffectiveness. Ultimately, he said, "you have to make their decisions for them."

¶8. (C) Shortley said that the S/E's negotiations with the NCP are often frustrating in that the Sudanese "want the carrots up front and the U.S. can't do that." Meles replied that "it's hard to teach an old dog new tricks," suggesting that the African Union might prove useful in this regard. He said the NCP had taken in recent years to hiding behind the AU because the U.S. position was not seen as productive. With the U.S. policy shift, he said the AU might now actively promote new ideas -- such as compromise on an election law -- as they emerge, effectively "providing the U.S. cover like IGAD did when the CPA was being negotiated."

¶9. (C) Meles then pointedly said the "U.S. also must learn new tricks, like patience," adding that "your timelines are all too fast," which he attributed to some corners of the USG continuing to harbor anti-NCP sentiments. Gration replied that some timelines are externally imposed, in particular by the elections schedule.

Meles seems to believe that he is god's gift to humanity. He seems to know it all, and the rest of are some how lesser beings. My question is whether Chewing Chat leads to delusional feelings
exaggerated self worth.