The Battle of Shire – February 1989

On the other hand the vicious and self-contradictory political and military policies of the military government together with the brutality of its forces towards civilians contributed greatly to the growth in the popular support for the TPLF. The inhuman activities of government soldiers in Tigray and other regions where anti-government movements operated has been reported as follows:

Whenever our army is ordered to control a certain zone, there is a sec­tion of society which permanently lives in the regions it controls. In this region women get raped by some elements of the army when their hus­bands leave for business, medical treatment, prayer etc. Pack animals are also looted. Cattle get slaughtered and eaten. Refusal to pay for what is eaten and drunk in the towns has been common. As the peasants come to appeal so as to get justice, they stay at the gate of the WPE for a week and for another week at the gate of administrative office. The administrator and others fail to give solutions to people’s complaint saying, “how can we accuse the army?”

Tigrean peasants had also other grievances related to government policies on resettlement, famine, drought etc., while people living in the neighboring regions too developed deep hatred to the government owing to problems ema­nating from similar policies such as villagization, formation of cooperatives, contributions etc.

TPLF’s fighting forces were composed of the following: the regular force; Zobawi Shaleka (Zonal battalion) and the peoples militia. The regular force grew from company level in 1978 to battalions in 1981 and to brigades by mid-1988. Towards the end of 1988 the regular force was organized into seven divisions each of which according to government estimates had about 3,600 fighters. The number of the zonal battalions is not known, but by 1988 there were several of them. The peoples militia, were recruited and unlike govern­ment militia were stationed within their respective localities all throughout the year. The militia was organized under the slogan “every locality should be an institution of opposition against the government.”

Until the mid-1980s the TPLF dominant form of operation remained guer­rilla warfare. Later however, the front conducted conventional war with supple­mentary guerrilla activities. The successes of the rebel’s offensives were largely owing to well-prepared and effective plans of military operation and other strong military qualities. Offensive military plans were then prepared on the basis of objective positions of both the rebels and government forces. Concerned TPLF commanders participated in the working out of operation plans while those posted to lead fighters to battles were sufficiently briefed and allowed to give comments on the planned offensives. Unlike army commanders of the govern­ment every TPLF commander had the decision making power.

The style of military operations of the TPLF was so dynamic that govern­ment forces suffered from considerable losses. Following are the three meth­ods of offensives it employed to destroy government forces.

In the first case a small force was first swiftly deployed to take closer positions to the strategic place controlled by government forces at unexpected times. A second but larger force then openly launches its offensive against government forces. The small force which had been close to government forces earlier breaks the government’s front, enters the governments defensive line and having destroyed heavy weapons and terrorizing the soldiers engages it­self in hand-to-hand combat. The fighting continues in this manner during the day time and during the nightfall the second force which spent the day fighting openly from a distance moves closer and takes position hidden to government forces. A third larger force then takes over the position of the second one. As the fighting begins on the morrow the third force launches an offensive while the second one which was closer to government forces in the meantime springs and inflicts more damage to government forces than that of the small force. The third main force then swiftly engages itself in hand-to-hand combat with the already disorganized government forces and having neutralized them gains control over the target area.

The second, but the widely known and the most effective style of opera­tion of the TPLF and which indeed is known to have contributed to the rebels successive victories was the Qoreta system. This is a kind of siege warfare where the TPLF forces first vertically envelope or cut off government forces, from each other, in a way where one could not help the other and then neutral­ize them one after another. In many cases intercepted government forces fought against each other. The Qorata style of warfare usually involved suicide mis­sions costing the lives of TPLF’s gallant combatants. The third style of offen­sive was an assault on government convoys.

Compared to government forces the rebels were also strong with respects to the availability and effective utilization of reserve forces. On the govern­ment side the fighting soldier had to leave his position to help victim col­leagues. On the rebels side, however, there was a reserve person behind each fighter.

The military government was forced to appreciate the strong military quali­ties of its adversaries as follows:

The bandit fighter knows his surrounding, is well- acquainted with the topography of the region, refrains from sexual affairs and has the readi­ness and courage for battles imprinted in his mind owing to the political orientation given to him and successive military victories they have won. In general, [The rebel fighters] does not wait for vehicles and with light items in his hands has developed the endurance to march from one place to another at a very high speed and together with the effective skills he has developed in firing at our [government] defensive fortress and de­fensive line; he has been able to boost his morale for fighting.

By about the mid-1980’s the TPLF was able to possess a sufficient quan­tity of light weapons but had almost no heavy weapons. In the light 1980’s however, it was able to acquire them. But interestingly enough TPLF’s main source of supply of armaments were government forces themselves. In a series of victories it won over government forces the front was able to increase its possession of weapons.

THE SETTING

In the late 1980’s the military government of Ethiopia found itself in a very critical situation. The standard of armed rebellion against the government was raised in all directions by the various political organizations.

In March 1988 the EPLF won a decisive victory over the highly concen­trated and well equipped forces of the government at Af’abet. The battle of Af’abet appeared to be a turning point in the history of the protracted war in Eritrea. The rebel forces captured several thousand soldiers of the Nadaw Command, a considerable number of modem weapons and ammunition in­cluding long-range Soviet made artillery and 50 tanks. The EPLF then made further advances and was able to control wider territories. These conditions forced the government to lift reinforcement forces from the different parts of the country to Eritrea.

In Tigray the TPLF launched offensive against government forces in Janu­ary 1988 and attacked those stationed at the Adigrat-Wugro line. But condi­tions became more dangerous to the government when its 3rd Army Division was lifted from Axum and sent to Keren in March 1988 following EPLF’s victory at Af’abet. In a series of offensives the TPLF destroyed government forces stationed at Rama, Adwa, Seleklaka and Shire. Only about 200 soldiers of the 17th Army Division were able to evacuate Shire and reach Gondar. Threatened by further rebel offensives, the government directed its efforts to­wards consolidating its position in defense of the town of Mekelle, the admin­istrative center of the region. TPLF fighters bypassed Mekelle and in a series of offensives launched as of 25/5/88 completely destroyed government forces and controlled Ambalage, Maichew, and Korem, all located on the Dessie-Mekelle road. By 5/6/88 the TPLF controlled the whole of Tigray except the town of Mekelle and its surrounding within the range of 15 kilometers radius. In the meantime, the EPDM (Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement), founded by a group of former EPRP fighters and with their base area at Sekota (north-western Wello) operated in northern Wello jointly with the TPLF. … continued on page 3