The Battle of Shire – February 1989

Between 19 June 1988 and 3 July 1988 the 604th core was able to regain control over 12 districts and reach Shire with no significant resistance from the TPLF forces.32 The general military condition of the government at Shire ac­cording to confidential archives of the previous government appeared to be as follows:

In light of its manpower, weapons it possessed, storage of its supply, its being deployed on strategic places etc. the government force which was found at the shire front was not expected to be unable to defend itself from rebels’ offensive. It was rather considered as a dependable force for the whole of autonomous region of Tigray.

Throughout the earlier period of government counter-offensives the TPLF was making a tactical retreat towards north western Tigray and its base area. Some of the senior military commanders however, felt that the TPLF’s with­drawal from the territory it had controlled was not because it had no combat capabilities but because of its desire to concentrate its forces from the purpose of stronger resistance. These senior commanders advised the “Overall Admin­istrator” that much care must be taken and that some of the government forces be assigned to control territory that would be used for the fall-back position in case of counter-offensive from the rebel forces. Legesse, however, flushed with the unexpected results of the previous military operations rejected the invalu­able advice given to him from the professional commanders saying “our aim is not to occupy territory but to capture the bandits”. Besides he insisted that the offensive campaign should be successfully accomplished in six months time regardless of existing objectives political and military realities in Tigray. In general, Legesse went on dictating conditions in accordance with the desire of Colonel Mengistu and himself.

Government intelligence networks had discovered three months earlier that the TPLF was making all necessary military preparations to launch offensive operations in the Shire front. However, despite the warning given from its in­telligence networks the TRA command launched its main campaign involving the 603rd Core to Dansha and Kazza, TPLF’s base area. The Dansha-Kazza campaign failed with considerable losses on the government side.

THE WAR AT THE SHIRE FRONT

The major and decisive war at the Shire front began on 28/12/88 with offensive operation of the 604th Core Army of the government and was con­cluded on 19/2/89 with the victory of the TPLF forces. The main battles were fought in four successive stages. During the first two stages the 604th Core launched offensive campaigns named Axum operation One and Two, while the third and fourth stages of the war at Shire were the time when the rebels launched offensive operations against the concentrated government forces at Salaklaka and Shire. But these were preceded by the government’s campaign to Adi Hagaray.

On January 8, 1988, 12 brigades of the 604th Core were deployed through Wor’i and Adi Kokob frontline, while 3 brigades were stationed at Shire. Fierce fighting took place at the above mentioned places. But the major battle was fought on 3 August 1988 at Adi Hagaray. According to reports compiled by the TRA Commander-in-Chief, government forces stationed at Adi Hagaray mutinied twice demanding for supply of clothing and ration, thus, allowing the rebel forces to launch a preemptive attack on government forces. After a bloody battle between the two forces the war at Adi Hagaray ended with the victory of the TPLF forces. Government forces then retreated and reached Shire by 9 July 1988.

After the battle of Adi Hagaray it was quite necessary to rehabilitate gov­ernment forces at Shire for some months. Between 9/8/88 and 28/12/88 there were no more government offensives and if there were any plans and sugges­tions to launch campaigns they appeared to be controversial and were not implemented.

AXUM OPERATION ONE

Axum Operation One was a joint operation between TRA and SRA (Sec­ond Revolutionary Army) and took place between 28/12/88 and 31/12/88 and its mission was to open the Shire-Asmara road so as to get a supply line to government forces deployed in and outside Shire. The 9th and the 16th army division were assigned to carry out the mission. On the other hand the 10th army division ofSRA and two additional brigades were deployed to launch an offensive operation from Rama. The government is also known to have rede­ployed 4000 prisoners of war which the TPLF had set-free a few weeks before the governments campaign.

On 28/12/88 the 16th Army Division was able to move forward up to about 12 km away from Chilla. However, on 29/12/88 this division was seriously attacked by the rebel forces and returned to Seleklaka after two days. Worse was the case of the 9th Army Division. It suffered from serious damages where according to the government report, it returned to Seleklaka on 31/12/88 with only 800 soldiers out of the 8,000 troops it had before the battle. The govern­ment then sent 2400 conscripts and the 103rd Commando Army Division with its four brigades from Mekelle to Shire. At the same time the 17th Army Divi­sion with its three brigades from Gondar and two additional brigades from Wello were sent to Mekelle.

The lifting of the 17th Army Division from Gondar reduced the defensive capacity of the 603rd Core Army and made the Gondar region vulnerable to rebels’ offensive. As the TPLF knew the government position in that direction it launched an offensive operation against the 603rd Core on 1/1/89 and having destroyed government forces stationed at Dabarq, Dabat, Gadebyu, Wugen and the surrounding area controlled the towns of Dabarq and Dabat on 3/1/89. During the war between the two forces, the people aligned with the TPLF and inflicted serious damages on government forces.

AXUM OPERATION TWO

After the failure ofAxum Operation One the TRA transferred its forward Headquarters from Mekelle to Shire. The Operation was planned to launch an offensive from Salaklaka and control the supply line, Axum-Rama-Asmara road.40 According to government reports TPLF forces deployed in the May Brazio-Aqab se’at front (8/2/89-9/2/89) were estimated to be three divisions, two heavy weapon companies and one division on reserve.

The government offensive operation began on 8/2/89. The 103rd Com­mando Army Division moved as a vanguard in the offensive campaign from Saleklaka. Except for minor skirmishes with a small TPLF force, the com­mando force was able to control the road up to about 70 kms away from Axum during the first two days. However, during the evening of 9/2/89 the 1035th Brigade of the commando division retreated backwards after a fierce battle at Chila. Neither the commando division nor the 604th Core had information about this. Besides one battalion of the 1032nd brigade lost its proper direction and on its way to Zana it was besieged and completely destroyed by the rebel forces. This was again not known to the division command. During the Axum Operation Two government Mig and helicopter fighters rendered supplemen­tary operations to the ground forces.

On 10/2/89 the TPLF launched an offensive attack against the 22nd brigade of the 16th division along the Aqab se’at-May Brazio front. The core command made efforts to send reinforcement to the battle but failed because the three brigades of the 9th division which had been assigned to stay on re-
serve to the core were not found in their respective positions. … continued on page 5