By Berhanu G. Balcha
The minority rule in Ethiopia has been greatly benefited from the paralyses to create effective and sustainable rapprochement between the Amharic speaking and Oromiffa speaking elites. Oromiffa and Amharic speaking people in Ethiopia account about 70 percent of the total population of the country, occupy about 50 percent of the landmass, with relatively better-educated manpower and resource availability. Neither the Amharic speaking, nor the Oromiffa speaking people lose in a genuine democratic transition, effective ethnic groups right or genuine federal arrangement in Ethiopia. These two language groups can constitute a Statsvolk or a core national people, as they are demographically and electorally dominant groups in Ethiopia to guarantee stability, rights and democracy in the country.
Recently, there are some encouraging initiatives. However, the initiatives have been compounded with confusions and difficulties. To start with, the minority regime in Ethiopia, which has worked very hard to exacerbate mistrusts and confusions between these dominant groups, is again restless in using various tactics to destroy the initiatives. Internally, the minority rule has advantages in commanding the national economy, national army and deceptive media, and externally, its opportunistic foreign policy has been pegged to the interest of a ‘neo-conservative’ interests of the super power that can guarantee material, moral and political support in order to countervail its weak internal legitimacy. These are the obvious behaviours of a minority rule: a total control of an economy, rely on a brutal army, utilising a deceptive media and act as a surrogate to external interest. It is logical and consistent that the minority regime in Ethiopia should do these in order to survive in power.
However, to emasculate the opportunistic and brutal tactics of the minority rule, the majority groups in Ethiopia must effectively do their homework with an effective, sustained and powerful popular resistance inside Ethiopia. The power of the ‘Statsvolk’, or the core and majoritarian national people would be the best way that could guarantee stability and democracy in Ethiopia. But not to install themselves as oppressive bi-ethnic hegemony over other groups, rather they can be protectors of rights of other minority groups. The people of the two language groups would certainly benefit more from a democratic political arrangement and respect of the rights of other groups in Ethiopia.
The Oromiffa speaking elite have to understand that firstly, the Amharic speaking people in Ethiopia have a considerable political power that cannot be easily undermined or disregarded. The unjustly and brutally imprisoned CUD’s leadership, for their considerable and crushing victory over the TPLF in May 2005 election, is a living and powerful example to get an important lesson. Secondly, there have been generational interconnections between these two larger groups; it has been both conflictual and harmonious, as it is the case of human interactions. The history of any human society, even a small homogeneous kin group, is full of past brutalities, killings and enmities. Self-readings of the past should not become an obstacle for current and future progresses. Thirdly, it is very difficult to find a peaceful way for the Oromiffa speaking people to get out of Ethiopia. It could be easier and possible to live together in peace, respect and democracy rather than to suffer or perish together simply to wish for break up. Political communities or human societies not necessarily need a peaceful past to live together; rather they need more peaceful present and common future: cultural identities and political identities can be reconciled or co-exist.
The Amharic speaking elite also have to understand that the struggle for ethnic rights or secession is not inherently undemocratic. In many democratic countries such as Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, India, Spain, USA the demands for ethnic rights or secession have been treated democratically. ‘Secessionists are on TV and in newspaper, and compete freely for elected office’. And secessionist political parties often get substantial support in elections- 40 percent in Quebec; 30 percent in Scotland; 15 percent in Flanders, the Basque country or Catalonia; and 5 percent in Puerto Rico’ (Will Kymlicka, ‘Emerging Western Models of Multinational Federalism: Are they Relevant for Africa?’, 2006:45). As, a distinguished scholar in the field of ethnonationalism, Walker Connor, indicates, that minority nationalism is a global phenomenon, it is:
“to be found in Africa (for example, Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka), Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France), North America (Guatemala), South America (Guyana), and Oceania (New Zealand). The list includes countries that are old (United Kingdom), as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia), as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada), as well as poor (Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China) as well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India) and Judaic (Israel)â€Â. (Walker Connor, ‘National Self-Determination and Tomorrow’s Political Map’ 1999: 163-4)
Thus, democracy may induce or reduce a demand for secession. If it creates an opportunity for fair representation and accommodation of politically significant groups, it may discourage a demand for secession, but there is no good evidence to claim that it would completely reduce or destroy ethnonational movements. Democracy would create an opportunity for all political groupings to compete for votes of the people. As a result, the ethnonational movements can also have a right to advance their political agenda in a democratic manner to attract the votes of their assumed constituency. Thus, democracy can create an opportunity or danger in multiethnic society in which separatist ethnonational movements are politically visible.
In connection to the situation in Ethiopia, it is obvious that ethnonational movements have been visible in country’s political arena since 1960s. No matter what we have labelled them, such as ‘narrow movements’ or ‘liberation movements’; ‘enemies of Ethiopia’ or ‘assets of Ethiopia’, ‘mercenaries’ or ‘genuine fighters’, the ethnonational movements have been a great irritation to the desire and project of a unified and melting-pot Ethiopia.
Nonetheless, separatist and regional movements are not unique phenomena that have happened only in Ethiopia; they are common political problems in state structuring processes everywhere in our planet. As we Ethiopians are part of this planet, ethnonational movements can also occur in our country. Therefore, it is important to consider the challenges rationally rather than to hide into some kind of a sacred or spiritual destiny that advocates the immunity of Ethiopia from ethnonationalist movements.
Ethnonationalist or liberation movements are part and parcel of the problems of politics in Ethiopia, as it has been the case in some other places; therefore they require a political solution. We may desire them to vanish or we may want them to be destroyed by force or by whatever metaphysical power, but the empirical evidences are trivial for success of such desires.
Consequently, if we assume that democracy will be a best option to tackle the major political problems in Ethiopia, thus the demands of the ethnonational or liberation movements would also be addressed in a democratic principle, in which the judge and jury would be the voices and votes of the Ethiopian people. Democracy is a system in which rival groups and hostile political philosophies and position would compete for the vote of the people in a peaceful manner. As a result, the ethnonational organisations such as ONC, OFDM, TAND, as well as the liberation or secession movements such as OLF, ONLF in Ethiopia can have a right to advocate their political programmes and compete for votes. In a democracy, any individual or political organisation has a right to advocate secession in a peaceful manner and to get elected, as it has been the case in many democratic countries such as Canada, Great Britain (Scotland), Spain, USA (Puerto Rico).
A democratic political system could bring an opportunity or danger for the unity of Ethiopia. If the ethnonational and liberation movements able to secure vast support and votes in a democratic election based on their appeal for separatism and exclusive group rights, we may be forced to accept the verdict of the people, as it is always very difficult to determine in advance the outcome of a democratic election. Are we envisioning such kind of democracy in Ethiopia? Or, are we envisioning a different model of democracy in Ethiopia that will put pre-conditions or restrictions on ethnonational and liberation movements? Although there may be different variants of democratic political systems, is there a consensus in Ethiopia among the major political groupings, civil society groups, ethnic communities and ordinary people regarding a democratic model that would be appropriate and acceptable to the Ethiopian people. The answer to this question has not been still determined and will not be also resolved so easily; it is an awesome political challenge that has been confronting the Ethiopian people.
The May 2005 election, however, signalled an important political direction in Ethiopia. Although many prominent political organisations like EPRP and OLF were excluded, the election reflected that a pan-Ethiopia and non-ethnonational political organization, CUD gained victory in major urban centers, including 100 percent victory in Addis Ababa, and overwhelming majority votes in the Amhara region and Gurage zone. Whereas, the ethnonational organizations within UEDF (such as ONC, HNDO and SEPDC), gained victory in Hadiya and western Shoa, and OFDM in Western Wellega area that reflect the ethnic background of the organizations. To be more specific regarding CUD, firstly, from the total of 140 national parliament seats of CUD’s ‘confirmed’ victory, 68 seats were in Amhara region (in towns and rural areas), 1 seat in Benishangul (urban area), 2 in Dire Dawa city, 1 in Harar city, 20 in Oromia (mainly in towns), and 25 seats in the SNNP (mainly in Gurage zone and in other towns) and 23 in Addis Ababa. Secondly, from the total of 139 electoral districts seats in which, CUD filed for irregularities, 53 are in Amhara region (in towns and rural areas), 33 in Oromia (mainly in towns), 43 in the SNNP (mainly in towns), 8 in Afar and 2 in Harar.
Thus, from the total of 279 electoral seats in which CUD would have won (which could have made him a winning party at the federal government level, but not necessarily in most of the regional states’ governments level) 121 seats would be from Amhara region (which was 87 percent of the regional state’s seats for the national parliament), 53 in Oromia (which was only 19 percent of the region’s seats for the national parliament), and 78 seats in the SNNP (which was 60 percent of the region’s seat in the national parliament). This could have made CUD a ruling party in the federal government, Addis Ababa administration, Amhara regional states and Gurage zone in the SNNP region, but very tiny minority party in the Oromia region and other regional states as well. Thus, it would have been indispensable to seek an effective participation of the larger regional state like Oromia to create a stable and effective governance system in Ethiopia following the May 2005 Election.
An effective alliance between the Oromiffa speaking and Amharic speaking people is a crucial condition, either to establish a democratic governance arrangement in Ethiopia or to accelerate the struggle against the tyranny of the minority TPLF rule. It is an essential task to aim in producing a just and viable political order that will protect individual and group rights, which are anchored on principles of human rights and democracy within the context of an integrated Ethiopia. It is essential to nurture a united Ethiopia that aims to suppress hubris and uphold humility, promote respect and trust while dissuading vengeances and pomposity, to produce a more accurate, sensitive and all-encompassing national history. Neither a tiny minority rule, a return to the past, secession, nor closed ethnic homelands would be alternative arrangements for Ethiopia.
Berhanu G. Balcha is the Vice-Chairman of the Network of Ethiopian Scholars (NES)-Scandinavian Chapter.
This writing does not necessarily reflect the views of NES-Scandinavian Chapter.
The author may be contacted at: [email protected]