The U.S. has brought substantial financial resources to bear in Sudan for both implementing the CPA and alleviating suffering in Darfur. It expended considerable political capital in helping to achieve the CPA, but has been much less successful in resolving the conflict in Darfur. The U.S. has far better relations with the SPLM than it has with the Bashir government, with whom relations are strained. The rocky relationship with Khartoum limits U.S. leverage to effect policy change in Darfur or to ensure implementation of the CPA.
The U.S. provides Ethiopia substantial assistance, although most of it in recent years has been emergency aid and support to counter HIV/AIDS. Washington also has a close working relationship with Addis Ababa. In theory, therefore, the U.S. has considerable leverage with the Meles government. At the same time, the close relations
with Ethiopia have contributed directly to a worsening of relations with Eritrea. The Isaias government accuses Washington of favoring Ethiopia on the border question. As a consequence, it asked the USAID mission to leave Eritrea. Washington has virtually no leverage with Eritrea. But even in the case of Ethiopia, leverage is a relative concept.
The leaderships in both Ethiopia and Eritrea since they assumed power in their respective countries in 1991 are notably resistant to outside pressure even when large amounts of assistance are at stake. Both Meles and Isaias will change positions on a policy only after they have concluded it is in the long-term interest of their respective governments. Recommendations for the U.S.
Taking the above analysis into account and as requested in the invitation to testify, I suggest the following recommendations for ways the U.S. can contribute to security, stability, growth, and democracy in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. I have purposely omitted many desirable recommendations that are hopelessly unrealistic or
beyond the ability of the U.S. to implement because of its limited leverage in one or more of the three countries.
Work closely with Ethiopia to encourage the TFG to create a government of national unity that includes moderates from the ARS and from sub-clans in Mogadishu who currently oppose the TFG.
Consult closely with the Somalia “Contact Group” and ask its members to follow the same approach with the TFG. Ask the Arab League and its member governments to encourage the ARS to engage without preconditions in power sharing talks with the TFG. Encourage governments that have good relations with Eritrea to follow the same approach with Eritrea vis-à-vis the ARS. If a government of national unity that is widely accepted by the Somali people actually materializes, be prepared quickly to mobilize a significant amount of development assistance for Somalia. Likewise, push the wealthier Arab countries to make major contributions to Somalia’s development.