Skip to content

Lessons Ethiopians can draw from Tunisia and Egypt uprisings

The following excerpts are taken from Dr Aklog Birara’s upcoming new book.

The Egyptian revolt showed that there is no script for avoiding the reengineering tactics of a repressive regime. The opposition must be flexible and far superior in its tactics and strategy than the regime. Resolve, persistence, organization and a common national purpose are fundamental. Ability to imagine that the future will be better than the past was most helpful. Egyptian protesters proved their ability to change a repressive system through unity of purpose. How did they do it? Activists figured out a new way of changing repressive regimes. They used information technology and raised social networking to a new level. These tools empowered ordinary people and took away the power of the regime and its media. Activists focused on police brutality. They exposed atrocities that galvanized people. Individual activists such as Wael Ghonim, the Google executive, broke the conventional way of communication through traditional media that is always government controlled. Social media became prominent. Some call these depictions and mobilization techniques “the Internet revolution.” Such a revolution is, however, immaterial unless it injects fresh thinking and organization that permeates the entire society. In Egypt this is exactly what happened. Ordinary people owned the revolution and changed a regime.

In Ethiopia and other countries, we saw that regime changes were never peaceful and never led to democracy. In 2005, Ethiopia came close; but did not gain support from the outside world. Democratization was not sustained internally either. […] The West repeated policy blunders by not defending the people‟s demands for fundamental political freedoms, civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law; and by not supporting the notion that Ethiopians can choose the form of government that will address their social and economic problems. Given this pattern, democratic activists and opposition groups in Ethiopia face a monumental task ahead of them.

For Ethiopian democrats to earn the respect and empathy of the international community, they must prove that they are capable of stimulating a paradigm shift in political culture and in establishing democratic institutions. First, they need to practice what they preach and then produce capable and respected leaders who empower youth and civil society. Blaming foreign governments for internal weaknesses makes no sense. Opposition groups must accept responsibility for their own mistakes and failures. Singular focus on regime change without solid organization and leadership undermines credibility.

Egypt has alternative leaders in the wings ready to take responsibility. In the transition, they possess a nationalist and capable military establishment that will ensure security and stability. In contrast to Ethiopia, the country is not sitting on an ethnic time bomb or plots from terrorist groups. The country is endowed with a talent pool from which it can draw. It has an established tradition of embracing new civic and professional leaders. These potential leaders have organic links to the population. It is the people and not individuals who seem to be at the center of the shift in political thinking. It is this organic link that makes the Egyptian uprising formidable and potentially enduring.

I often find myself arguing with compatriots concerning the distinction between a single leader such as Meles Zenawi–the Ethiopian Prime Minster for close to 21 years–and the institutions his party built from scratch. These new institutions are not national. They are largely ethnic-based. By and large, they replaced national entities including the armed forces. Post Emperor HaileSelassie, regimes did not attach value to enduring national institutions. The Military Dictatorship institutionalized socialism and the current one ethnicity. In the event of a popular revolt in Ethiopia, opposition groups ought to learn from past mistakes and manage transitions more effectively and prudently. They need to do this far in advance. Reaction is never a substitute for planning. Change must have the popular support of all ethnic and religious groups who want freedom. Otherwise, it will fail.

There are two things that those who support the current Ethiopian regime fear most. First is ethnic revenge. Opposition groups must diffuse this fear.

Second, those who benefited from the current regime must know that their properties and assets will be guaranteed. They must know that corruption, nepotism and cronyism will be investigated and persecuted through the legal system or through neutral and independent commissions.

The world witnesses that transitions to a democratic order are always messy. Members and supporters of the old regime fear the future and resist it. Those who want change are not always sure what the future will be like. Most Ethiopians are apathetic. In the Diaspora, those who are detached from the political process constitute the “silent majority.” It is here where wise and flexible leadership that can attract this middle can play a vital role. In a country like Egypt, “An urgent priority is to rewrite the rules so that free and fair elections are possible.” The Egyptian Supreme Military Command vowed that this will be done. In the third week of March, 2011, Egyptians went to the polls; and 77 percent voted in favor of constitutional and other reforms. Among the major changes is term limit of four years for presidents, renewable only once. The task of institution building has begun in Egypt. The same prioritization applies to Ethiopia. What would be the ground rules? Who will provide oversight? Will the military play a constructive and bridging role or will it side with the regime?

Regime change in Ethiopia would require the rewriting of the current constitution. Here, the South African process model will be appropriate. Studies must begin now. A quick fix won‟t do. “In 1997, South Africa enacted an interim constitution to govern the country while it undertook an ambitious constitution-writing process with wide popular consultation–which is the ideal arrangement.”

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Ethiopia faces the hurdle of ethnic federalism in general and Article 39 in particular. The article permits secession. The speculation of civil uprising that may lead to Ethiopia‟s disintegration may be far fetched but should not be dismissed. Will any democratic transition retain this provision or will it put the matter to a national referendum for all Ethiopians to consider and decide. My view is that all of the Ethiopian people and not ethnic elites should voice their views and decide. It is in part this provision that makes foreign governments weary of regime change. The current regime believes that transition to democracy will lead to further fragmentation. For this reason, ethnic-based liberation movements harm the democratization process for the people they claim to represent. The best contribution they can make is to renounce secession and work for democratic unity firmed on unfettered equality. Secessionist tendencies strengthen the regime and weaken unified struggle. Even those who prefer democracy over tyranny feel obliged to defend the current regime. They contend that at least, it provides stability and keeps the country intact.

Political elites in Ethiopia are hardly the country‟s greatest assets. Their dysfunctional behaviors and actions are among the reasons why the country is still in a mess. Power must reside in the Ethiopian people, especially youth.

Democracy emanates from the people. We see this to be the case in the United States where civic associations led by ordinary people impact the political process each and every day. “Government of the people; by the people and for the people” is not an empty phrase. The American Revolution benefitted from social networking. At the time, publications proved effective. Unlike democratization of the past, today‟s revolutions will be instigated and led by youth. Traditional politicians must grasp this phenomenal change and work within it. This social group is the most idealistic and boldest in shaping the future. The young people who changed history in Egypt and Tunisia and are now fighting in almost every country in the Middle East and North Africa lived under one leader. They only knew one form of governance. The same is true in Ethiopia. Combine the duration of two successive repressive and oppressive regimes; you find that the country‟s youth knows either one or two dictators. Repressive conditions in Ethiopia disallow participation in the political process. This does not mean that youth is totally apathetic and detached from the plight of the society. In light of this, the Ethiopian Diaspora can‟t assume that it will serve as a substitute for internally generated and led popular uprising. In my assessment, its role should be to provide tools, intellectual guidance, direction, policy options, knowledge and funding. It can fill a void in communication by strengthening social media. It can educate the public to disavow violence against any group. It can diffuse ethnic animosity and tensions. It can stop opportunistic signals that say that secession is acceptable. It can raise awareness that uprising does not mean revenge or destruction of private or public property. It can vow to uphold decency, civility, commitment for the sanctity of life and protection of property. Modeling democratic behavior is one of the most powerful weapons in pursuing a democratic path.

“In Egypt and Tunisia, the young people who planned, organized and implemented the protests were educated, Internet-savvy activists with no political affiliation.” They rejected suffocating and corrupt systems. “They were enthusiastically joined by secular as much as by Islamist voices. After watching the fervor unleashed in the in January, 2011, young Syrians, Bahrainis, Algerians and even the quiescent Libyans are turning to Facebook and Twitter to call for their own “day of rage.” The “outrage” that beamed in Tunisia spread to Egypt. No one knows where the ripple effect will spread next and how soon. It is always critical that we connect outrage to social, economic and political causes and not to personalities. The Gallop Poll and other organizations show similar patterns in the region as well as the rest of the Middle East. These include denial of “political rights and civil liberties, high incidence of corruption, low levels of well being and high unemployment. “Social change in the Middle East, particularly the growing number of educated youth who struggle to find jobs and are determined to live in dignity, is not unique to Tunisia and Egypt. Across the region, leaders are finding out that economic liberalization in political systems that lack accountability cannot protect against popular upheaval.” I would add endemic corruption to the list. “Unlike Tunisia where power and corruption were tightly centralized in the ruling family, the tentacles of the of Egypt‟s regime stretch from the army to the internal security forces and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Every element of the regime, including a military with significant business interests, has too much at stake to relinquish power easily.”

The spread of corruption and exclusion comes close to Ethiopia‟s. The Egyptian situation was like the TPLF/EPRDF‟s in terms of repression and brutality but different in terms of merger of ethnicity, party and state. Ethiopia is more like Libya and Yemen than Tunisia or Egypt. Ethiopia and Libya are among the least urbanized countries in Africa. Colonel Gaddafi ruled Libya with an iron fist for more than 42 years. Mr. Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia did the same thing for almost 21 years. It won‟t surprise me if he wishes to match Colonel Gaddafi in terms of reacting to a popular revolt. Remember, his party vowed to govern Ethiopia for 100 years. Both deny fundamental freedoms and are brutal in dealing with dissent. Both restrict press and civic freedoms. They control and rely on state owned media in propagating their ideologies and in conveying to the outside world that their peoples are doing well. Both preach revolutionary democracy through decentralization. In reality, it is they who dictate policies and investments. Power emanates and ends with them and not with ordinary citizens. Libya does better in dealing with its restive population because of immense oil wealth. Ethiopia does not have the same luxury and flexibility. In contrast, Libya does not face a serious prospect of ethnic-based disintegration in the event of regime change. Ethiopia does. Libya‟s military is national and Ethiopia‟s is not. Despite some of these differences, Libyans and Ethiopians suffer from similar oppressive systems.

In Egypt, military institutions permeate and dominate life. Business interests and military officers have cordial relationships. Some experts estimate that 60 percent of the Egyptian economy is dominated by or affiliated with military folks. Close to 60 years of domination by military leaders and institutions incentivized high officers to defend the system. Parallel to this and by design the Ethiopian regime strengthened the stakes of key officials and institutions including the military by vesting them with political and economic powers. Wealth and asset concentration in a small group provides strong incentives in maintaining the status quo. Not only does narrow group interest thrive on corruption; it has high tolerance for inequality and high unemployment. Khalaf quotes recent Gallop research findings on Tunisia and Egypt that show that the population does not feel that it is thriving. “The percentage of people who felt they were “thriving” has been on the decline even as gross domestic product has increased.” At the same time, the rich get richer. A recent estimate puts Mubarak‟s personal assets at $7.2 billion. Il-gotten wealth from the system is estimated at more than $70 billion. Three ministers were barred from traveling out of the country. The US government froze assets of Colonel Gaddafi and his family. The same is true in Ethiopia. Global Financial Integrity estimated that in 2010 illicit outflow of funds amounted to $11 billion and is rising. The bizarre story of 10 thousand tons of Ethiopian coffee–amounting to 25,000 truckloads, “disappearing” without a trace is telling. On February, 2011, Ethiopian Review posted a piece under the appropriate title “Who stole ten thousand tons of Ethiopian coffee?” It is a symptom of corruption and erosion of ethics in the society. Prime Minister Meles called business people and announced the incident. He said two things that I found remarkable. Someone must be “held accountable.” Fair enough. How does a regime hold anyone else accountable when it is the source of the problem? The second thing he said was “All of us are implicated in this incident. We know but pay a blind eye.” There is a wise Chinese saying that “fish rots from the head.” Corruption begins from the top and spreads like cancer. Thousands of truckloads can‟t just disappear from a warehouse without facilitators and partners. Those with connections to the regime have a better chance of making this kind of heist. He did not mention that the regime will go after the thieves. It may be a family affair. No matter the growth rate, a regime with a high tolerance for corruption can‟s claim that its development policy is pro-poor. Similar to Ethiopia, gains from growth and increase in the domestic product did not filter down to the poor and youth in Egypt or Tunisia. This condition demystifies the Ethiopian regime‟s argument that growth improved the lives of people. Forty-six percent of Ethiopians want to leave their country. This preference is due to lack of opportunities at home. Same thing happens in Egypt. In the case of Egypt, “Only 20 percent of Egyptians surveyed said their well being has improved since 2009.” Even in oil revenue rich Saudi Arabia, its “young population has not felt the benefits of oil wealth.” The facades of democracy apparent in these countries and in Ethiopia are simply a joke. In 2010, the governing party won 99.6 percent of the votes. Just think of it. This is the reason why the façade of democracy is a joke. “It is in Arab countries that have erected facades of democracy that citizens are most likely to rise up against their rulers.”

Whether the façade of democracy refers to Arab countries or Ethiopia, the fact remains that fundamental political freedoms, civil liberties and human rights have been squashed.

The world can no longer afford to ignore this condition. The human and economic costs are too high. We saw in Tunisia and Egypt that it is for compelling reasons that youth and poor people rose and sacrificed their lives. In both cases, they won. I do not believe that hatred drove youth to rebel and take matters into their own hands. It is passion and commitment for justice, freedom, the rule of law and a better future that did. Those of us on the outside should recognize that the struggle was about them and not about elites or foreign powers. It wasn’t about the military. Because it is internally generated and led, no one but those on the ground controlled events. This is why popular revolutions are unstoppable. They happened in France, the United States, Eastern Europe , Indonesia and other places.“This is certainly the view in Cairo, where protesters and analysts say the uprising is not about the United States, not about Israel and not about Egyptian foreign policy. There are 80 million Egyptians.” The struggle is “about them.”

The above diagnosis leads me to one major conclusion concerning Ethiopia. Future struggle of the Ethiopian people is about them and their country. It is not about the Diaspora or about political elites who seek power. It is not about the West or the East. Ethiopian elites of all persuasions must grasp the importance of this paradigm shift from elites to ordinary citizens. When millions of people rise in unison, no regime can stop them. Ethiopians can‟t rely solely on the small middle class to sustain change; or on the peasantry that has to work hard to survive. Elites can‟t self select and dictate democracy to ordinary citizens. If they do, they will continue to be perceived as being part of the problem. For this reason, I would argue that the Diaspora must play a catalytic role that is anchored in an organic link with the Ethiopian people, especially youth. The most important tools they could provide youth and others in Ethiopia are to break regime control of the media and financial aid. They could do this by promoting widespread and strategic use of the information revolution. They can provide the tools and strengthen social-network users such as Face book and information enablers such as Twitter to circumvent state media and to incapacitate it. The internet revolution, satellite television and social media proved that repressive regimes can no longer rely on traditional media to dictate the future. Tunisians and Egyptians taught us that the future belongs to those who share Wael Ghonim‟s thesis that “Freedom is a bless that deserves fighting for.”

(The writer can be reached at: [email protected])

7 thoughts on “Lessons Ethiopians can draw from Tunisia and Egypt uprisings

  1. Lessons from the Ivory Coast

    FrontPageMag.com

    The crisis in the Ivory Coast has important lessons for Europe, Israel and the United States. And none of these lessons is being conveyed by the Western media.

    The most important aspects of the crisis in the Ivory Coast are being overlooked or deliberately disguised by the Western media. One can read media report after media report without discovering the basic fact that the Northern Ivory Coast “rebels” are Muslims. Indeed they are Muslims who by and large entered the Ivory Coast as infiltrators, through borders that are poorly patrolled, from neighboring countries. A better advertisement for stronger border control cannot be found. At least four million illegal immigrants, mostly Muslim, entered the Ivory Coast during the past two decades, tilting the demographic balance there.

    And these Muslim infiltrators and interlopers, increasingly backed by African, French and Western powers, are challenging the control by Ivory Coast natives over their own country. The sufferings and violence in the Ivory Coast may well illustrate what awaits Europe if it continues its own demographic suicide and if it continues to flood itself with Muslim immigrants. The conflict also illustrates the extent to which the Western powers are willing to subvert their commitment to Wilsonian principles. Since Woodrow Wilson and the end of World War I, the West was nominally committed to erecting and defending nation states. We now see that the Western powers (and African regimes) are willing to abandon this set of principles whenever faced with a cheap way to curry favor with Muslims. Finally, it shows what awaits Israel if its seditious Left ever has its way and implements a Palestinian “Right of Return” that converts Israel into a “bi-national state.”

    The Ivory Coast of today, or Côte d’Ivoire, is essentially a bi-national state, although each “nation” is in fact a collection of tribes. The northern “nation” is Muslim; the southern “nation” consists of Christians and other Non-Muslims. Built upon a territory that had once been home to several tribal statelets before the era of colonization, it fell under French partial control in the 1840s, and became a formal French colony in 1893. French is still the official language spoken there, in addition to many local tribal tongues. The French hung around until 1960, when the Ivory Coast became independent. Once independent, the country was one of the most prosperous in Africa, thanks to its large cocoa crop. The country has been politically unstable since a coup in 1999 and a civil war that began in 2002.

    The background to the civil war and the current constitutional crisis is the massive in-migration of Muslims from the countries neighboring the Ivory Coast, mainly from Burkina Faso. The infiltrators settled in the northern half of the country, and also in pockets in the south, including in some neighborhoods inside the country’s largest city, Abidjan. Today Muslims, including illegals, are almost 40% of the population of the country (although Muslim and other sources claim they are really considerably higher), the remainder being a mixture of Christians (mainly Roman Catholics) and animists.

    Tensions between the immigrant population and the indigenous Ivorians goes back to the 1960s. Successive governments there have regarded the immigrants to be “circumstantial Ivorians” (their term), as opposed to the “pure Ivorians,” who are the natives. The illegal “aliens” constitute more than a quarter of the current population of the country. The alien-native dichotomy overlaps to a large extent with the divisions between non-Muslims and Muslims, and is the most important background factor in explaining the ongoing civil war.

    The current political standoff in the Ivory Coast is largely a Muslim-Christian confrontation. The “rebels” represent the Muslims of the country, especially of the north, and in particular the “aliens.” They are led by Hassan Ouattara, whose parents were evidently illegal immigrants into the Ivory Coast from Burkina Faso. Hence he personally illustrates and epitomizes the “alien” character of the “rebel” forces. An economist who once worked for the IMF, he calls his rebel militia the “New Force.” The “government” forces represent the indigenous and traditional non-Muslim Ivorians. Their leader is the current President (or, if you prefer, “president”) Laurent Gbagbo, a one-time university professor, who has been the official head of state since 2000. He claims to be a socialist and anti-imperialist. The government claims that neighboring Muslim states have intervened in the civil war on the side of the Muslims.

    Civil war broke out in the country in 2002. The “rebels,” whose support base is the Muslim north, challenged the “government,” whose power base was the non-Muslim south. Atrocities were committed on both sides. Each side accuses the other of using mercenaries. French military forces in the country participated in some of the fighting, increasingly on the side of the “rebels.”

    The elections that were to have taken place in 2005 were postponed repeatedly until 2010, in part at the initiative of the UN. A power-sharing arrangement between the two main sides in the conflict went into effect in 2007 but did not hold for long. None of the forces in the country seemed to want new elections to be held, since electoral forces were evenly matched between the two halves of the now “bi-national” state. When they were eventually held in 2010, Gbagbo lost by a thin margin. But he refused to accept those results as conclusive and compelling. Aside from claims of widespread fraud, Gbagbo insisted that the victory of the party of Ouattaro was entirely thanks to the votes of the millions of illegal immigrants participating in the election!

    Other African countries, led by predominantly-Muslim Nigeria, have been backing the “rebels.” A number of African countries have called for armed intervention on the side of those “rebels.” After a period of respite, violence began to escalate a few weeks ago. New Forces, now renamed the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (RFCI) have been beating Gbagbo’s army in the field, took the country’s capital city, and are now holding parts of Abidjan. Gbagbo is under siege in his headquarters and expected to fall any day now. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled the battle zones, seeking refuge in neighboring countries, especially Liberia.

    The conflict is too complex for a simplistic assignment of forces into categories of “good buys” and “bad guys.” There are solid bases for skepticism about the true commitment to democratic rule by either side.

    Nevertheless, the conflict in the Ivory Coast shows what happens when massive illegal immigration leads to the demographic eclipse of a native population. The same Western powers so ready to strip the Serbs of their heartland to create a second Albanian nation-state in Kosovo have been unwilling to sustain any nation-state for indigenous Ivorians, and indeed have backed the aliens. Evidently the Western countries still adhere to Wilsonian principles about ethnic states and self-determination only when it is to the liking of Muslims.

    But the even more obvious lesson from all this is the instability of “bi-national” states and the impossibility of preventing them from morphing into killing grounds. This should have been obvious from the experiences in Rwanda.

    Yet this is precisely the fashionable “solution” to the Middle East conflict being promoted by the Bash-Israel Lobby. The bigots and boycotters demand that Israel agree to be demolished and enfolded into a larger “bi-national state,” one that would be dominated by Arabs and Muslims. Such an experiment in “bi-nationalism” would end in the best-case scenario as a civil war resembling the one in the Ivory Coast, and in the worst-case scenario in a Rwandan-style genocide. Ultimately, a new genocide against Jews is exactly what the Anti-Israel Lobby seeks. It is also the hidden agenda of the “BDS” (or Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement of economic aggression against Israel, and its close ally, the “Israel Apartheid Week” Hitlerjugend.

    Massive Muslim immigration is also transforming Europe demographically, in ways strikingly similar to the influx of immigrants into the Ivory Coast. France, Belgium, and other parts of Western Europe may soon find themselves the European Ivorians, the “Other,” the stranger and disenfranchised inside their own home countries.

  2. Elias

    For Ethiopian democrats to earn the respect and empathy of the international community, they must prove that they are capable of stimulating a paradigm shift in political culture and in establishing democratic institutions. First, they need to practice what they preach and then produce capable and respected leaders who empower youth and civil society. Blaming foreign governments for internal weaknesses makes no sense. Opposition groups must accept responsibility for their own mistakes and failures. Singular focus on regime change without solid organization and leadership undermines credibility.”

    Ethiopian peoples has shown the world their rejection of woyanne in a beautiful sunny day by coming out in a millions in the year 2005 and which was approved by 300 European observer team that the election is rigged,it was the British support for this criminal gujille to let them stay in power with advice and later the first once to free their temporarily stopped financial support followed by others only after a short while ,with all due respect for Dr Aklog it is only the Ethiopian peoples power that topples the woyanne of cource by paying sacrifies as woyanne is not Mubarak or Ben Ali “Zenawi is the enemy of all Ethiopians even tegres if he could get the support of the military which i hope not he can create small damage before he will be taken like laurent Bagbo which will be the happiest day of 79.5 million if we take out his tegre and adere supporters out as woyannes

  3. tt7,

    Please, please don’t pretend that you are the ONLY ONE who knows about the situation in Ivory Coast more than any body else in this whole wide world. Tyrant Gbagbo lost and his opponent won in a free and fair election being physically supervised and verified both by the national and the international election observers.

    Gangster style of “my way or no way” leads to the prison highway. If you are so fanatic and empathic about the loser why don’t you go to jail on his behalf so that you may inherit the kingdom of God in later days.Remember that this is 21st century where we have to respect all religions, regions and ethnicity both within a country as well as between countries. European NEO NAZI style chest pumping racist propaganda serves no purpose. You think you know about all Europeans even more than Europeans themselves.

  4. We demand a smaller states in Ethiopia. The big regions in the country like somale, amhara, or Oromya should be classified into smaller states for development and good governance. Fore example, shoa is a state by itself. begemdir is the same. Wollega and arsi are other example which can administer them selves. For your information Shoa social democratic party and Movement for development and freedom for Wollega are now the two examples which shows that people are interested to develop their local area rather than huge region which the do not have any feeling or concern for. The Chairman for Wollega movement said once that they do not have any feeling for the east or south. He said he feels that they are ethiopians but wolleges are not the same with the south or east Oromo.
    Anyways demand for Smaller States will be the next agenda soon. Shoa said no one should decide for Shoa except the shoas.

  5. Negaasa,

    You sound like a cunning fox Wayane agitator pretending to take the society centuries back wards for the purpose of promoting its spinless propaganda of indespensability as a uniting force deserving international support against multiplying petty separatists of the medieval variety. Of course, if people are not able to go forwards, some try to walk backwards. Shame!

    You better stand up and fight for democracy, eqality, justice and welfare for all like all of these good Nordic wefare countries where political, economical, social and other important matters are humanistic even with out having several mini states and several mini petty feudal princes.

    Well, you may demand smaller states and smaller princes for all those smaler states, an idea which may also give good reasons for tyrants and their international supporters to unite and fight petty and divisive provocative petty ideas.

    What for do you really need all of these multiple petty mini states with their petty mini princes like some of those petty Somali Warlords catering only to their big bellies while the normal people are/were dying from hunger, disease, violences, insecurities as well as national and international displaceemnts and global refugeeism(Zemene Mesafint of the zemene 21st?)if we have equality, democracy, justice for all as well as good governance. We can have genuine federation that treats all areas, regions, cultures, resources, etc. as to produce economies of scale in production, distribution, consumption, marketing, wellbeing and welfare. Change does not mean going back to the medieval cave societies primitive structure of primitive governance.

    Our genuine grand vision, mission and strategy needs to be for the building of the genuinly sustainable democratic and economic development of the entire horn region as a region of peace, well being and wellfare as it has always been the cradle of human origine and human civilization. Your multiple mini states and mini princes will only become a convinient mini breakfast for the neighbouring united big states. Wake up from your day dreams!

  6. The writer precisely diagnosis Ethiopia’s current dilemma and offers the way out of it. It is true that diasporas alone won’t bring the tyrant Zenawi down. It has to be all inclusinve struggle especially the people in Ethiopia and use more the technology that is available to interact. That is exactly what brother Eskinder Nega has said, “Fight tyranny using PC.”

    Why are those above talking about nonsense? I was expecting relevant comment on the article posted. Are they trying to diverge attention?

Leave a Reply