US policy objectives, options on the Horn (Theresa Whelan)

Evaluating U.S. Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa

Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on African Affairs

March 11, 2008

Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.

Introduction

Good morning, Chairman Feingold, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the situation in the Horn of Africa, and the Department of Defense’s activities in the region. Africa, and the Horn of Africa in particular, is a region of great strategic importance to the United States. At the crossroads of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East, the Horn presents a series of complex threats to U.S. national security, including weak governance, lawlessness, territorial disputes, and safe havens for terrorism. If ignored or unaddressed, all of these issues will have dire consequences for the people of the Horn, for the broader region, for our friends and Allies on the continent, and for the United States. We believe that a coordinated U.S. foreign and national security policy in the Horn of Africa, of which our defense relations are a component, is of critical importance to U.S. strategic and security interests.

Department of Defense in the Horn

The Department of Defense’s activities in the Horn are a subset of the U.S. national strategy for Africa, as outlined by the President in National Security Presidential Directive 50, and support the Department of State’s foreign policy goals of countering terrorism and building local capacity. Our activities with African partners focus on issues of mutual strategic concern, including the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prevention of arms and human trafficking, and ensuring enduring access to land and sea lanes of communication. We address these security interests by working with African partners to promote civilian control and defense reform, and to build local military capacity. This is achieved by ensuring their militaries are appropriately sized and funded, by
professionalizing militaries through training to develop and maintain well-trained and disciplined forces with a respect for law and human rights, and by building capacity of African partner militaries that positively contribute to combating terrorism, and that prevent and respond to national and regional crises. Theater security cooperation remains the cornerstone of our strategy to enhance partner capabilities and to promote these relationships and common interests. Within the Horn, our engagement and activities are governed by the realities of regional instability and our bilateral relationships.

Ethiopia

The security situation in Ethiopia remains challenging and complex, with profound regional implications. One area of significant concern is the on-going border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea dedicate a significant portion of military resources and efforts to manning the border region, and we remain concerned about the possibility for renewal of hostilities along the border. We believe that any return to conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would undermine stability throughout the entire region.

Beyond the border, Ethiopia is facing genuine security concerns in the Ogaden region. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) continues to wage a separatist movement in the Ogaden region with outside support, including from neighboring Eritrea. Following the April 2007 attack that killed nine Chinese oil workers and more than 70 Ethiopians, the Government of Ethiopia increased its operations in a coordinated counterinsurgency campaign in the region. As a result, we have seen increased military operations coupled with restrictions on commercial traffic and humanitarian access. We continue to monitor the situation in the Ogaden, but given that we no longer have the level of access that we previously had to the region, we are unable to confirm the actual facts on the ground. We are, however, acutely aware that for a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful, the military must respect the local civilian populace.