By Messay Kebede
Both the farcical kangaroo court and the use of blackmail to extort guilt and demand for forgiveness reflect one goal and one goal only, namely, the resolution to humiliate CUD leaders. We must ask the question of knowing why a ruling party and the representative of a national state feel the need to humiliate their political adversaries. What does the commitment to humiliate tell us about the inner thought of the jailers of the CUD leaders and, by extension, of the Ethiopian people?
To the extent that humiliation wants to degrade a person in his /her dignity, it is clear that one cannot degrade what one has not already recognized as superior or better. I want to humiliate means that I want to disgrace what is surpassing me, more exactly, what I have already recognized as being above me. To be sure, it is natural that loss frustrates me, but I harbor the resolution to humiliate only insofar as I admit my inability. Were I confident of my ability, I would refrain from humiliating my opponent. I want my adversary in full shape and armament, for only then does my victory reflect my inner ability. The more the integrity of my adversary is intact, the more shining is my victory.
In an unequal competition between two opponents, the high standing of one opponent induces meanness in the other, which meanness craves for nothing but the infliction of humiliation. Meanness carries the sense of inferiority: since I cannot be like him, I have to bring him down. But in order to hide my meanness to myself, I need to construe humiliation as punishment. I cannot do so, however, unless I obtain a confession of guilt. Without the admission of guilt, only my meanness, that is, my ingloriousness remains.
The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, argued that the sole purpose of punishment must be to elevate the lawbreaker. In punishing criminals, society does not more than bring them back into the human community, which they left by violating its laws. Any motive for punishment other than the promotion of humanness is inspired by revenge. Inasmuch as revenge refuses integration, it directly targets the degradation of the criminal.
In their dealings with CUD leaders, Meles and the TPLF government have shown no other motive than revenge. The imprisonment and the court are punishment for their electoral success, which they thus secretly admit. Why, otherwise, would them become revengeful and resort to humiliating behavior? Suppose for one second that the TPLF was really convinced of its own electoral victory. It would have used all the available democratic means to make its case, thereby moving away from the use of violence and humiliating measures.
Meles and the TPLF government know that any agreement obtained while CUD leaders are in prison has neither moral nor legal value. The purpose of an agreement under duress cannot be the desire to achieve reconciliation, either: the latter is not in sight so long as freedom is made conditional on admission of guilt. Only the need to inflict humiliation makes sense of such a behavior. It is meant to show that CUD leaders are not so glorious after all. In admitting guilt, they exhibit how unwilling they are to sacrifice their freedom for their principles. The behavior squarely recalls the Derg’s cruelty toward the civilian left, which also originated from the inner sense of unworthiness.
Given this goal of humiliation, it is very hard to attribute any positive outcome to the effort of conciliators. If we are to believe the document released by the TPLF government, the signed agreement––assuming that it is authentic––puts the entire blame on the CUD leaders, thereby fully exonerating Meles and his government. The admission of guilt is exchanged for freedom obtained through the further humiliating condition of the jailed begging for forgiveness and of the government showing mercy. The intervention of conciliators has achieved nothing, since the same agreement, if such we can call a completely one-sided document, could have been obtained without their mediation. Worse yet, the mediators could be accused of participating in the conspiracy to humiliate the prisoners. Even if the released letter is proved to be forged, it does no more than confirm the intent to humiliate.
Let us briefly see what the terms of real reconciliation should have been. Since the imprisonment has created an impasse for both parties, the only way out beneficial for all is the strengthening of the democratic process. From this impasse, no one should benefit except democracy. For only one outcome can dilute the conflict: the victory of democracy, the continuation and strengthening of the democratic process.
The process should beginning by an assessment of the reasons why suspicions and conflicts emerged during and after the election. Both the TPLF and the CUD must recognize that they were dragged into conflictual attitudes and behaviors subsequent to the absence of trustworthy institutional mechanisms guaranteeing the fairness of the electoral process. This way of analyzing the situation gets us out of the impasse resulting from mutual accusation and suspicion. Such an approach can quickly move toward discussion over how to avoid future conflicts, thereby focusing on the strengthening of the democratic process.
The discussion implies the unconditional release of the jailed leaders while making them full partners in the continuation and strengthening of the democratic process. They no longer blame the government for past conducts; they work with the government to avoid similar derailments in the future. In return, the government is exonerated from its violent behavior insofar as the behavior is attributed to weak democratic mechanisms. In this way, everybody says: let by gone be by gone; on the basis of past lessons, let us move forward.
This way of solving the problem penalizes and humiliates nobody. The government comes out reinforced: the promotion of reconciliation and the continuation of the democratic process are none other than the virtues it needs to fare better in the coming election. I don’t see how people would not be sensitive to TPLF leaders arguing that the manner they solved the crisis validates their democratic credentials and their ability to promote a peaceful and prosperous Ethiopia. Such a party will become a much tougher adversary to beat in the next election.
As to CUD leaders, they secure their freedom without any humiliation, but regain their parliamentary seats and behave as leaders of a minority party. In exchange for recognizing the ruling party as a majority party, they secure constitutional and institutional changes preventing the occurrence of similar problems in the future. Their participation makes sense because they achieve what they had wanted all along, to wit, the promotion of democracy.
Messay Kebede, Professor of philosophy, University of Dayton, Ohio (USA). He can be reached at [email protected]